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Abstract
This paper explores the issues of the participant 
interviewer in a military history context.  Participant 
interviewers may have a stake in the results of their 
work, as they are part of the story that is under 
investigation and can influence the result to fit their 
prejudices.  This paper focuses on the strong desire that 
the interviewees have to correct errors in the official 
record.  As Alessandro Portelli says, ‘oral history is not 
just a collection of stories, but also their interpretation 
and representation.’1  A narrative recorded by a 
participant may produce a realistic interpretation of 
battlefield events rather than the official, battalion, or a 
popular military history of those times.  This article is 
based on oral histories of national servicemen, regular 
soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers, and 
gives an exposure of the issues involved in a participant 
interviewer taking oral histories.
Introduction
I served as platoon commander of 2 Platoon, Alpha 
Company, Second Battalion, Royal Australian 
Regiment (2RAR) in Vietnam during 1967, with a 
group of thirty-three men under my command.  My 
platoon was one of the uncelebrated sub-units of the 
Australian Army’s deployment in the Vietnam War. 
Unfortunately however, it came to prominence as the 
result of an incident causing the deaths of Vietnamese 
civilians.  This incident has been discussed a number of 
times in newspaper articles and military history books.2 
These accounts, often based on scanty information, 
quickly acquired the status of history.  
My desire to offer an alternative account, based on 
the experiences of eyewitnesses, was the genesis of 
my recording the oral histories of my platoon and 
the reason for assembling their views of the facts as 
the participants believed they occurred.  Eighteen 
of the thirty-three soldiers in the platoon consented 
to provide oral histories of their experiences during 
the war.  Each oral history interview was conducted 
using a questionnaire covering their service from their 
initial contact with the Army until discharge.  Of these 
eighteen veterans, ten discussed the killing of the four 
civilians in their accounts.  This article focuses on the 
relationship between the interviewees and me as the 
interviewer.  For concise and easy management, this 
article will explore one particular incident that occurred 
of which the narrators spoke.
Methodology
The main methodology used was the narrative 
interview.  A questionnaire was designed based on 
one in an annex to Gary McKay’s Fragments of 
Vietnam - four pages of questions divided into specific 
sections.3  It was an extensive set of questions divided 
into sub-sections with specific queries, starting with 
entry and induction into the Army, and ending with 
their discharge.  Questions were aimed at eliciting 
information on service life following the veteran’s 
path from their initial training through to their final 
training as part of a battle-ready battalion, and then 
their deployment with that battalion into Vietnam.  The 
veterans’ opinions on their service and their return to 
Australia were sought.
These veterans’ narratives could then be compared 
with archival records to situate and verify details. 
The main archival record was the commander’s diary, 
which is available on the internet in digital form.  Some 
documents, like the description of a soldier’s wound, 
needed an off-line search in the National Archives 
Collection, mainly at the Australian War Memorial 
(AWM) Canberra.
The method moved to an ethnographic one where the 
narratives and the documentary evidence were then 
tested against the societal, cultural and ritual norms 
of the veteran world.  As trauma was involved, some 
research also required consultations with psychological 
papers and experts.  Further reading was conducted on 
the assumption that post-traumatic distress disorder 
has a spiritual dimension.
My process was to record the veterans’ narratives using 
the questionnaire.  One other member spoke to me by 
telephone, but an oral history was not recorded.  Two 
participants were killed in action during November 
The Diggers’ wish: set the record 
straight
Ben Morris
[This paper has been peer-reviewed]
2
1967.  Three others have died since their return from 
Vietnam, one of whom took part in this research. 
The ‘chronological method’ as outlined in Alistair 
Thomson’s book ANZAC Memories was used as a guide 
to conduct the interviews.4  I began with the open-
ended question: ‘Where did you join the Army?’  Some 
participants needed no further encouragement to start 
their army narrative.  If the narrator stalled, I was able 
to offer a further question that returned them to their 
account.  On occasions I moved from the chronological 
method to the popular memory approach to ascertain 
further details.  The popular memory approach is 
discussed in ANZAC Memories and frames questions 
in accordance with my recollection of events.5  This 
process focuses on a particular event and explores that 
incident.  This brought further information forward that 
may have been missed in following the chronological 
format.   Most of the veterans were initially reluctant 
to talk about the accidental killing of Vietnamese 
civilians, which has become known as the ‘Bamboo 
Pickers Incident,’ showing that it was a part of their 
battlefield experience they wished to forget.  Most did 
not speak of this matter until the mode of questioning 
was changed from chronological to popular.  
To Accept or Not To Accept?
All interviews except two were conducted in the 
interviewees’ homes, which gave the veteran a relaxed 
and familiar location in which to recall their memories. 
When a narrator invited me to stay at his home I 
accepted, as this placed the narrator in the role of the 
host, and I became the guest.  This helped to change the 
power dynamics, as I then had to fit into the narrator’s 
routine, rather than the other way around, with the 
narrator controlling the environment.  This meant that 
our recording sessions were subjected to the domestic 
routine of the household, such as meal timings.  The 
breaks to accommodate the domestic events resulted 
in round table discussions with the wife or partner, 
which added some interesting details.  On one 
occasion, the wife declared that she had heard more 
in forty-eight hours about another ambush, than she 
had in the previous forty years.  The different ambush 
was central to that narrator’s war chronicle.  She 
also claimed that the narrator had not fully informed 
his psychiatrist of certain facts.  Some expeditious 
computer research resulted in the veteran taking 
additional information to his next consultation, and as 
a result, gained an increase in his pension.  Frequently 
there was a comment on the next day that the veteran 
had had his best night’s sleep since leaving Vietnam. 
At one breakfast the partner declared the same 
information with great clarity.
The interviews took far longer than veterans anticipated, 
mainly because they took the view at the outset that 
they had nothing of interest to say.  This may reflect the 
supposition that as an officer, I knew everything, while 
they knew nothing.  As the interviews proceeded, these 
men tended to become more engaged and forthcoming 
as though we had returned to the platoon of 1967, and 
they were having an informal chat with ‘the boss.’ 
Their recall was far more extensive than they thought 
possible.   I continued the interview until the narrator 
claimed that he had nothing more to say.   I was often 
more exhausted than the narrator.6
Oral histories can provide a primary source of 
information about events, conditions and operations 
by soldiers on the battlefield.  As Hagopian comments; 
… the value of the oral histories does not lie in 
their providing unmediated truths. ...  Even when 
they remain true to events, veterans’ stories may 
adjust to societal expectations - or what veterans 
believe their audience wishes to hear. The stories 
may also respond to the other narratives that 
circulate around the storyteller … 7
The Incident
On 20th October 1967, fifteen members of the platoon 
and I commenced a patrol of the four thousand metre 
wide exclusion zone surrounding the Australian Task 
Force base area at Nui Dat, Vietnam.8  This exclusion 
area was designed to prevent the enemy coming close 
enough to the base to launch an attack on the Australian 
position.9  The exterior perimeter, called Line Alpha, 
was situated on the edge of Vietnamese effective 
mortar range, to prevent the enemy from providing 
fire support in an attack on the Australian base.10  Line 
Alpha did not follow any geographical feature or 
fence, and was not marked.  It was only a line on a 
map.11  Between Line Alpha and the base perimeter 
fence was a ‘free fire’ zone, which meant that anyone 
or thing that moved within this area was a target.12  The 
local Vietnamese were banned from this area and this 
was communicated to them by various means.13  The 
soldiers had retrieved leaflets that were airdropped in 
the ‘free fire’ area warning the locals that they were 
in a prohibited area.  Task Force headquarters advised 
that the relevant Vietnamese authorities had briefed 
the locals.  Available information suggested that no 
friendly people would be inside Line Alpha.  Constant 
patrolling prevented enemy penetration.14
On the evening of 22nd October 1967, this patrol laid 
an ambush about one thousand metres inside Line 
Alpha.15  Early the following morning, a group of 
civilians entered the ambush area.  One person in this 
group took a long object off his shoulder and waved it 
at the soldiers.16   The machine gunner opened fire, as 
he believed it was a weapon.
The firing lasted less than 30 seconds, and in that 
time the platoon’s machine guns and rifles had killed 
four civilians and badly wounded a fifth who later 
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died.  There were another six wounded. 17  The order 
to cease-fire was given when it became clear that the 
platoon had fired on unarmed persons, including women 
and children.  The platoon returned to base.18  Later we 
learned that the villagers had been looking for bamboo 
thus the incident became known as the ‘Bamboo Pickers’ 
ambush.
On the platoon’s return to the Nui Dat Base, the Company 
Commander suggested to me that the platoon should 
have been carrying captured enemy weapons to place on 
dead bodies.19  This would allow the battalion to claim 
these dead as enemy.  The Australians had adopted the 
American system of rating an operation’s success on the 
body count.  It seemed that the Company Commander 
wanted the company’s statistics enhanced.
In my opinion, this was deceitful and undoubtedly illegal. 
I was prepared to account for this incident and record the 
details correctly.  During our discussion, the Company 
Commander instructed me as to how I was to write my 
report.  This conversation was conducted out of hearing 
range of any other person.  My report was written with 
a reference to the conversation about enemy weapons, 
but I was later ordered to sign a report that had my 
observations about these directions deleted.   As I was 
uneasy with these instructions, I kept a personal copy 
of the ‘after action report’ in case I was ever accused of 
breaching the Geneva conventions. 20  This patrol report 
with the company commander’s preferred wording is 
below.  The lines of the paste-over are evident in the 
reproduction.
The narratives I recorded during my research are all 
influenced by the ANZAC legend.  A number of the 
narrators recall that their instructors during their initial 
training constantly repeated that they were part of the 
great ANZAC story.21    This theme of the ANZAC 
permeates their narratives.
As Portelli highlights, our interviewees come to an 
interview with an agenda of their own. 22  My narrators 
wanted to position themselves within the ANZAC 
legend.  Some related their family members’ service 
in previous wars with their Vietnam experience, while 
others made connections with the grand ANZAC 
tradition of volunteering to serve their country in distant 
lands, motivated by a sense of patriotism.23  This reflects 
the fact that the ANZAC legend and the digger tradition 
remains a popular way for a veteran to recall their 
service. Lex McAulay, Gary McKay and other authors 
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have suggested that the Vietnam veteran was a member 
of the ANZAC story.24
What Did He Say?
The transcribers of the veterans’ recordings experienced 
problems understanding the veterans’ language.  These 
difficulties usually occurred when interviewees 
came to an emotionally traumatic event.  Two things 
occurred simultaneously, firstly the narrator lowered 
his voice, and secondly he lapsed into a vernacular 
of the mid-1960s, which was a mixture of Australian 
Army jargon, Army argot, the language of Americans 
serving in Vietnam, and Armed Forces Radio Saigon 
speak.25  The battlefield moments that made the greatest 
impression had to be spoken in the idiom of their war.  I 
was an insider, therefore I knew what they were saying, 
but an outsider like the transcribers did not.  I believe 
that it was an effort by the veterans to keep the secrets 
in the ‘family,’ but also allowed them to discuss their 
service so the record could be set straight.26  This to 
the outsider may sound confusing but in the veteran 
world represents a path to achieve conflicting goals. 
Conflicting purposes were often the norm on the 
battlefield.
In August 1976, Dr Jim Cairns, a member of the 
Labor Party and principal organiser of the Vietnam 
Moratorium movement in Australia, alleged in a 
Melbourne newspaper that Australian troops in 
Vietnam had killed twenty-seven civilians and most 
probably declared them as enemy rather than civilian 
deaths.27  This caused a political furore and bought out 
the conflicting ideological positions of the proponents 
of a debate between the politicians, media and veterans.
The Minister for Defence at that time, the Hon. James 
Killen, a member of the Coalition Government which 
had committed troops to Vietnam, claimed that the 
allegations were defamatory of the nation and attacked 
the good name of the Australian Army.28  He related 
the Vietnam veteran to the ANZAC Legend.  Killen’s 
position was that Australian troops would never commit 
such an ‘atrocity’ and promised a full scale inquiry.29
The word ‘atrocity’ had been used by the media and the 
Minister, but not by Dr. Cairns.30  His allegation was 
simply that he had been told that Australian soldiers had 
massacred civilians.  He had no proof to as to whether 
the dead were civilians or the enemy.  These newspaper 
articles support Gary Kulik’s contention that in stories 
about war, most military history and discussions of 
events on the battlefield, tend to confirm the speaker’s 
ideology, political and social pre-conceptions.31  
Following the initial furore, there were claims and 
counter claims throughout the week until the Minister 
stated that he had not been given any specific details 
about civilians being killed so he was not prepared 
to convene an inquiry into Cairns’ allegations.32  On 
Sunday 8th August the Sydney papers attacked Cairns 
for his naiveté and left-wing views, while the Brisbane 
Sun had a front page headline ‘The Atrocity is on 
File.’33  
On that same morning I was contacted by Army Office 
and asked to report on the following day, to the Director 
General of Operational Plans.34  On the Monday, only 
a week after Cairns had made his allegations, I was 
searching the commanders’ diaries with the Army 
Historian, Major Ian McNeil.35  At the same time, the 
ABC program, This Day Tonight, was arranging for 
two of my soldiers to appear on their program in which 
they confirmed that civilians had been killed in the 23rd 
October 1967 ambush by Australian troops.  Their facts 
did not match Cairns’ numbers or dates; however it was 
an attempt by them to set the record straight.36  Prior to 
appearing on the program, one veteran rang the army 
asking for support but this was denied because he was 
now a civilian.  There was considerable time separating 
the two different ambush events; one occurred on 23rd 
October 1967, and the second on the night of 11th/12th 
August 1970. 
At last, Minister Killen’s requirement for an 
investigation had been fulfilled – namely, the identities 
of two ABC informants and their unit were declared.37 
However, a full enquiry failed to eventuate, and it was 
never clear whether any of the ABC informants (all 
four) were talking of the same incident referred to by 
Cairns, who was being castigated for his opposition 
to the war and political views.  It appeared that the 
Defence Force’s rebuttal of Dr Cairns’ allegation was 
far more important than the facts about civilian deaths, 
which were not addressed.   The simple fact that the 
protagonists were talking about several different events 
was lost in the debate.
Over the years, there have been suggestions at Vietnam 
Veterans’ reunions and other gatherings that soldiers’ 
histories have not been recorded correctly.  While the 
veterans I interviewed were among those who made 
that complaint, it emerged during the interviews that 
few, if any, had read the official history, much less 
checked the commander’s diary that is accessible 
through the Australian War Memorial website.38  The 
unease that these soldiers have about the accurate 
recording of history, seems to have been formed from 
listening to other veterans speak, reading ‘populist 
histories’, listening to ANZAC Day orations or being 
informed by the media.
Setting The Record Straight
Forty years after Vietnam, I decided to attempt to 
change this situation.  I enrolled at the University of 
Wollongong to study the history of the Vietnam War 
and veterans’ oral histories and set the record straight.39 
While the narrators remembered there was media 
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coverage of the ambush, none were able to give any 
accurate dates, as though it was all too painful.  None 
of the narrators were able to place the media interest 
accurately, and one participant said that this furore 
occurred two years after our time in Vietnam:
... two years after there was an article in a 
Sydney paper, Sydney Telegraph, ‘Australia’s 
My Lai’, and it was about that action. Two 
people that I know of for sure, Participant S 
and Non-Participant C, were contacted by the 
Sydney press about that story and both of them 
told the reporters to go and get rooted, that there 
was nothing in it.40 
The non-participant spoke unprompted about the 
incident and like the rest could not remember the 
specific details like the date.  He claimed the ABC 
approached him after Cairns had identified him.  This 
puzzled me as Battalion Headquarters in Vietnam 
only received consolidated company lists and would 
not be able to determine an individual’s platoon. 
His identification by the media should be attributed 
to someone who knew who were members of the 
platoon but did not know that this veteran was absent 
on the day in question.  The non-participant made the 
following comment:
… when I came back to Australia I was 
pursued [by] a fellow because he found out 
from a politician who found out that I was in 2 
platoon.  He pursued me for quite a long time 
trying to get, he had journalists from current 
affair programs on television and I can’t recall 
the title of the program on this particular day 
when they were really pressing me, and they 
said they’d have a helicopter, a journalist up 
there on a chopper from Sydney, … and it 
would be on television that night.  Anyway I 
refused again to say anything.  Number one, I 
wasn’t there and I’d already told them I wasn’t 
there.  And secondly I didn’t want to talk about 
it. It’s not … right to talk about those sorts of 
things in my opinion because who’s going 
to prove what those people were anyway… 
Anyway, they eventually got a fellow and I 
can’t recall who it was, up further north, up the 
coast in Townsville or Ayr or somewhere up 
there to talk to them on TV, and I actually saw 
him being interviewed but I can’t recall what 
happened.41  
While lacking details about the incident, he gives 
the background to the time and cultural detail, 
which is one of oral history’s features.  With another 
interviewer, it is possible that he may not have raised 
the issue of the ambush at all, as he said:
 … I thought very strongly about not talking 
about those sorts of things to anybody.42
The relationship between the interviewer and narrator 
in this research is different from normal oral histories, 
in that the interviewer had an earlier relationship and 
they were participants in the events recalled.  This 
relationship was partly defined by military law, and 
partly was built by working together in hard, harsh 
and difficult conditions, against a number of common 
obstacles including an enemy who was intent on 
killing us.  This group welded together as a combat 
unit which shared a common military language, lore 
and tradition.  We were of comparable age, similar 
cultural backgrounds, and had a deep knowledge of 
the events being discussed in the interviews.  All were 
indoctrinated with the same warrior tradition and 
sense of belonging to the group.  There were some 
differences; for example the platoon was divided 
into Catholics and Protestants, which was still an 
important distinction in the 1960s.
The situation was somewhat different to the existing 
literature on insider oral history collection due to the 
similarities between narrators and interviewer rather 
than the differences.  This introduces a different 
focus and some new factors into oral history theory. 
There are a number of insider-outsider articles in 
the oral history literature but they tend to be based 
on gender, tribal taboo or generational parameters. 
While there were some similarities with these 
situations, it was different.  It was all male, same 
age and similar background scenario.43
There was no formal debriefing of the patrol as 
depicted in Fred Allison’s ‘Remembering a Vietnam 
Firefight.’44  Allison’s methodology was to compare 
a patrol debriefing with interviews taken many years 
later.  In this case there was no debriefing to consult. 
There had been no discussion at the time nor did the 
platoon openly discuss the event at reunions or other 
 The Age, 2 August 1976.
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gatherings.  Generally snide comments were made 
by those in the know who wished to obtain a reaction 
from a platoon member generally by officers at 
officer functions.  This incident was in the corporate 
memory but not fully documented.
Conduct Becoming an Officer
At the Royal Military College in officer training I 
had been indoctrinated with the idea that officers do 
not fraternise with soldiers.  Normal convention was 
that officers socialised and lived in different areas 
from soldiers.  Even in Vietnam, while the officers 
lived with the troops when on operations, there was 
delineation between officers and enlisted men in the 
Nui Dat base.45  Each company had its own officers’ 
and sergeants’ mess, separating ranks for meals, 
socialising and relaxing; but as a fighting group we 
were one inseparable unit and interdependent on 
each other.  This interdependence was mentioned by 
a number of narrators.  It highlighted the narrator’s 
role and a link with the interviewer.
These narratives crossed a number of boundaries 
in sharing events, secrets and feelings.  As Paul 
Thompson comments, ‘the interviewer sits at the 
feet of the narrators and learns from those who know 
more about the subject’.46   Here, I was the former 
officer now collaborating with my former soldiers to 
produce a history.  
In this research, I have moved from that position 
of command and absolute authority, to a situation 
of equality.  I had to divest my authority and be 
surprised and on occasions where it occurred, to resist 
‘correcting’ the narrative if my recollection differed 
from the narrator.  I had to hear the interviewee, 
and not force their testimony to confirm my own 
recollections.  I had to surrender my leadership role 
and become an equal participant in the interview 
with the narrator.  This was not easy.
Prior to each recording, interviewees would ask 
what I wanted them to say.  It sounded like they 
were seeking my instructions on how they were to 
conduct their interview.  While such questions may 
be normal at the start of any oral history interview, in 
this situation it seemed that I was still the authority 
figure.  Portelli suggests that some oral history 
interviewees require a mandate from the interviewer 
and will often try to tell the interviewer what they 
think they want to hear.47  I would explain that I 
wanted to record each individual’s experience as he 
remembered it, nothing else.  I made it clear that I 
was investigating private memory and not the public 
memory of the war.  I clarified that I was conducting 
research, not a witch-hunt, about past events.  This 
discussion gave them ‘permission to speak,’ and 
even though there was some initial awkwardness, 
all interviewees quickly became comfortable in 
their role.  Some interviewees offered to use their 
diaries, notebooks and published works to help them 
remember.  I repeated that I was interested in their 
unaided memory.  Specific detail could be checked 
later but initially it was their private memory that I 
was pursuing.
The preferred option was to say nothing if they 
wanted something left off the record.   Silence 
was the solution most took when an issue arose 
that they preferred not to discuss.  There seems to 
be an unwritten list of subjects that should not be 
spoken about that illustrates Thomson and Seal’s 
observations about conflicting parts in the ANZAC 
Legend.48  Some wished to only talk about that which 
added to the national legend.  This produced an issue 
for the interviewer as to whether silences represent 
a lack of knowledge or protection of their preferred 
view of the war.
The Advertiser, 3 August 1976.
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Past-Past
I was very familiar with the platoon’s actions since I 
commanded its operations.  My responsibilities meant 
I moved around the platoon to make sure my plans 
were being executed, and adjusted them if necessary. 
My narrators could have assumed that I was a witness 
to most of their actions on the battlefield and I knew all 
the painful, unpleasant and ‘unsafe” moments.  Thus 
the narrator had an audience of one who knew the 
‘essentials.’  While this was not always a certainty, it 
was a given to the narrator.
At times, the interview entered what may be 
called the past-past.  We were actually back on the 
battlefield with some narrators telling me exactly 
where others and I were standing. We did not need 
the lens of the present for both the narrator and 
interviewer had been there and the lens of those 
days was used.  However, facts were essential and 
necessary and this may explain why some wish to 
resort to published works.   
There was an acceptance of our shared experience 
as veterans.  This was the most important factor in 
enabling a productive and respectful conversation 
about our platoon’s role in the Vietnam War.  Like 
the veterans, I too had a personal agenda in wanting 
to ‘set the record straight.’49  The events subsequent 
to the Brisbane Sun exposé concerned me.50  Firstly, 
the article written by a former national serviceman 
portrayed the incident as an atrocity.   Secondly the 
Minister claimed that only ‘rogue soldiers’ killed 
civilians and accidents identifying friend from foe 
in his discussion did not exist.
How did my interviewees recall the ambush?  Most 
remembered their role with a remarkable degree 
of clarity, confirming the literature that suggests 
that traumatic events occupy a special place in 
an individual’s memory.51  Portelli makes the 
observation that public opinion and the media may 
prefer fantasies, unreliable sources and myths to 
the reality of the soldiers’ world.52  It produces a far 
nicer picture of the war.  On the other hand, when 
soldiers interview soldiers, there is a temptation 
to reconstruct a shared past that, consciously or 
unconsciously, may portray events in a light that 
flatters them and satisfies the expectation of their 
audience.53  Truth may not only be a casualty of war, 
but memories and some retelling of events may also 
damage it.
My own memories about the incident are vivid. 
The moment between the machine gun firing on the 
civilians and hearing the whimpering of children 
caught in the gunfire was very short but still remains 
with all.
I knew instantly on hearing the cries for help that 
something was very wrong.  I ordered the platoon 
to cease fire and ran towards the killing ground to 
assess the carnage I realised had taken place.  I was 
confronted with a scene that will haunt me forever. 
As I moved forward I was inwardly hoping that 
the residual firing would kill me.  It is testimony to 
the training of the men that I was not hit.  Was it 
my learned skill to move among the weapons that 
prevented me being another death that morning or 
was it the skill of the soldiers who knew where I was 
heading?  I often wonder.
Do We Really Have To Talk 
About This?
Only two narrators mentioned the ‘Bamboo Pickers’ 
of their own accord and one of them was not on the 
ambush patrol.  It is possible that a non-participant 
interviewer may not have obtained details of this 
incident, as most did not discuss the ambush without 
a direct question.  If the participant who volunteered 
Brisbane Sunday Sun, 8 August 1976.
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information on the bamboo pickers was not interviewed 
then a non-participant interviewee would not be 
aware of the incident.  This participant trusted me and 
therefore spoke about the incident.  I doubt that any of 
the participants would have trusted a non-participant 
with these memories, and would have remained silent 
on this story thus leaving it hidden.
In the interviews I was asking my men to recall a 
matter which had confused me and which, like them, I 
had buried within me.  This incident lasted less than a 
minute but its legacy lasted for years.  One participant 
describes the ambush this way:
Very quick; not very long.  Shit, how do you 
tell time in that. I would say it was all over in 
a minute, two minutes. There was, I mean it 
would have gone a lot longer if there had have 
been some armed men there but I think once it 
was really obvious there wasn’t anyone armed 
there that the shooting stopped pretty quick. 
Yeah that’s all that I can remember of that. I 
remember waiting for them to be taken away 
with the chopper, holding them up and ... I 
remember that guy with a sickle.54
The same participant makes the suggestion that the 
ambush was a set up:
I don’t know what was behind that ambush; I 
mean obviously we knew they were going to be 
there, that was the way it struck me. So someone 
had organised for us to brass them up.55
The non-participant mentioned earlier spoke in defence 
of our actions:
As far I was concerned we all did the best we 
could over there and if somebody got in the 
road then bad luck, particularly if they shouldn’t 
have been there.  I don’t believe these people 
should have been where they were.56
The participant who gave the longest commentary on 
the incident spoke for twice as long as any other narrator. 
He claimed that the platoon was tasked with the patrol 
because it was a punishment for misbehaviour that had 
attracted the wrath of a higher authority.  These were 
his comments:
Our section of the platoon got sprung with beer 
in our lines and this happened all the time but 
for some reason or other we got sprung because 
they used to put them under floorboards. 
Anyway our platoon had to provide a three-day 
TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility) patrol, 
which was highly unusual, because that was 
usually provided by the D & E platoon (Defence 
& Employment Platoon). For some reason there 
was no one, I guess the rare circumstances 
they didn’t do it they went to other platoons 
and would say, ‘You’ve got to supply a TAOR 
party.’ Anyway because someone had found 
beer in our lines, which was a very regular 
occurrence, they said, ‘Take half a platoon, get 
out on this TAOR patrol.’ It turned out to be a 
bit different with tragic consequences and I’m 
not sure whether it was on the third morning or 
the second morning.  
Interviewer: Okay do you want to talk about 
what you remember of the Bamboo Pickers?
Interviewee:  Because it was a three-day 
TAOR patrol and having been on quite a few 
operations I think we thought this was, ok we 
are being punished, but it was a safe country. I 
remember TAOR patrols had been through ever 
since the taskforce commanded it was a three 
thousand yard or metre no-go zone I think, 
free fire zone, so you really wouldn’t expect 
to see anyone there. I know they had to keep 
the patrols up but it was almost routine and if 
they hadn’t have kept them up it might have had 
more serious consequences. 57
Other narrators make a similar comment.  It is as though 
the narrators needed an excuse.  They believe that they 
should not have been involved in this incident. They 
were suggesting that they had no option about being 
there.  
Examination of the Task Force Patrol Program however, 
suggests that the patrol allocations were distributed 
evenly between companies.58  The participant quoted 
above was located at the rear of the ambush setting, 
and so was not an eye-witness to the event, but spent 
considerable time in recalling the incident and theorising 
Brisbane Sunday Sun, 8 August 1976.
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about the locals’ knowledge of the exclusion zone.  He 
offered to produce a copy of a pamphlet, which warns 
the locals of their exclusion.  He detailed the medical 
evacuation process and finished with a fantasised 
ending in which he incorrectly claimed the RAAF 
disposed of the bodies at sea.59  This is in conflict with 
the commander’s diary.60   The bodies were returned to 
their village.  The participant verbalises and adapts a 
popular myth in Vietnamese, American and Australian 
literature that Vietnamese were on occasions thrown out 
of helicopters.61  He couldn’t recall where he sourced 
this myth.  He confirms Hagopian’s observation that 
narrators often tell stories that circulate around them 
in their chronicle.62  He was wounded in the following 
month and he nearly died.  It could be that this near 
death experience focused his attention on events that 
occurred just prior to his wounding.
Conflicting Points Of View 
The non-participant may have been trying to change 
my point of view on events.  This narrator and I had 
previously had a number of discussions, which had 
diverged along paths of opposing philosophies. One 
ANZAC Day, our discussion had reached a point that 
another platoon member had to separate us to prevent a 
physical altercation.  I had wondered in my preparation 
for this research if this history between us would 
influence the final outcome of the interview.  Portelli in 
his work observes that sometimes persons of opposing 
points of view may produce a good interview due to 
the fact that both sides are trying to win the other over, 
while reaching the satisfaction of having their view 
recorded.63
The other narrator present at this ANZAC Day 
occurrence initially refused to discuss the ambush at 
all.  However, after a discussion off tape, he gave the 
following explanation:
I’d like to backtrack.  There was a question that 
Ben asked me earlier about the civvies ambush, 
and I said to him at the time ‘I’m not going to 
talk about it.’  The reason I didn’t want to talk 
about it was it affected Ben badly, and I didn’t 
want to offend him, so therefore I said to him 
‘I’m not going to talk about it.’  I’ve thought 
about it since, spoken to Ben about it, and I’ll 
now speak about it because quite frankly I don’t 
believe that we were in the wrong.  We were 
in the right when we opened that ambush up, 
because we were 1000 metres away from the 
nearest village; we had a dark to dawn curfew on 
all civvies; anything that moved in that period 
was enemy.  When we opened the ambush up, 
when we had our targets in the killing area, it 
was just starting to break first light; and in that 
situation, I have no problems at all.  I justified 
it to myself then, and I’ll do it again, now.  We 
Courier Mail, 10 August 1976.
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were right in opening that ambush up.  It was 
unfortunate that civvies, both old and young 
were caught up in it, but they were in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.  I’d just like to clear 
that point, because I know it affected Ben.  It 
didn’t worry me at all, and it still doesn’t worry 
me today on that same issue.  But we’ll move 
on from there.64
This was the total of his words on the incident except 
for an emphatic ‘No’ earlier.  He spoke about me in the 
third person as though he was correcting the record. 
He discloses it was an operational accident rather than 
intentional killing of civilians.  He had set the record 
straight and he was not going to discuss it any further 
and the interview moved on as he had requested.
The majority of the platoon was censorious of the 
machine gunner, who initiated the ambush.  As a 
participant said:
To this day, from what I’ve heard from others 
involved in that action it was totally unnecessary. 
The bloke on the machine gun was told not to 
fire by his Number 2, they were civilians, and 
he just opened up and I think we know who that 
person was ...
Later the same participant makes the comment:
Going back to the machine gunner (name given) 
I do remember now being told later on that he 
[the man with the stick] aimed and, it may have 
been the machine gun second in command, that 
he thought it was a rifle and you shoot first and 
ask questions later …65
The soldier who most likely fired the first shot died 
before he could be interviewed. On this patrol the usual 
machine gunner was absent and he volunteered to take 
this position. His widow gave very specific details of 
this incident, telling me that she had learnt about the 
ambush by listening to her husband talking in his sleep. 
She claimed that he had never discussed the matter 
with her.  Her knowledge was remarkably accurate and 
detailed.
Yet another participant, the number two on the machine 
gun, said:
I can remember the fuckin’ stick and I thought 
it was a rifle.
Well he was about from here to that post away 
from me. I could see the stick and I just kept 
quiet and looking around everybody and then 
someone opened up and that was it. Because 
they must have seen the same thing but I could 
see it was a stick. So everyone just opened up ...
Interviewer: It looked like a rifle?
Interviewee: Yeah it did. Once one bullet fired 
everyone went.  All they needed was one bloke 
to pull the trigger.66
This participant’s testimony suggests that he had 
seen what he believed to be a weapon, but had then 
identified it as a stick, before the firing started.  He did 
not know what to do and was considering this aspect 
when the ambush was sprung.  Confusion seems to be 
the one consistent feature of the narratives.
One participant brings the confusion theme out while 
suggesting that others were controlling the patrol:
… they were supposed to be in an unauthorised 
zone or something.  No, we were never told 
anything; it was all covered up wasn’t it?  I 
think after that they decided it was time for us to 
go back to camp; is that correct?  They thought 
that we’d had enough by then and we had.67
Another remembers:
And we had to get up and fuck off and head 
straight back to Nui Dat.  Yeah; straight back.68
One participant is certain that he had killed two young 
girls that day.  Their wounds were consistent with the 
ballistics of his weapon. I was amazed by the detail the 
veteran was able to remember:
To this day I believe I was responsible for 
killing two teenage girls.  I was the only one 
in the unit [sic] with an armalite and one of 
the girls had a bullet in the head, just a little 
black spot; if she had been hit with a 7.62 she 
would have had a hole in the back of her head 
and there was nothing.  The other one was the 
same situation, shot in the chest just above the 
breast and there again just a little black hole and 
the size of an adult Vietnamese from that range 
a 7.62 would have taken half her back out, but 
there was nothing, just those two little black 
holes.  I was the only one with an armalite, there 
were no F1s, no 9 Mil weapons there that day; 
the rest are one M60 or me with the armalite.69
After the platoon had returned to base, one participant 
threw his machine gun down in front of the platoon 
sergeant and exclaimed, ‘I am a murderer.’70  The 
sergeant addressed him by his first name and said, 
‘Pick up that machine gun and come to my tent.’71 
The participant did so and they had a discussion about 
civilians killing a soldier.  The sergeant stated that these 
civilians were in a prohibited area and could have been 
VC supporters.  He then advised the soldier he would 
take no action over the mishandling of his machine gun 
if the soldier went and cleaned the weapon and relaxed 
while pondering the sergeant´s advice.
After return to Australia, another participant had this 
experience during a visit to the local markets:
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I remember one day down here at the markets 
when I was going through a rough time, an 
Asian woman in a blue shirt like that woman 
had on came walking through the crowd and 
you know I really believed it was her.  I thought 
she was going to come over and tell me off. I 
thought, she’s gonna fuckin’ give me an earful 
that woman, that’s how my head had gone 
stupid.72
Discussion
While my research presents a less than glowing picture 
of our battlefield experience, it is not my intention 
to question the courage or bravery of our soldiers. 
Some historians may challenge this research because 
it ventures into the psychological realm.  The details 
embedded in these oral histories are the narrators’ 
realities, and in this case the facts tallied with the 
commander’s diary and other official documents.  At 
the same time it must be accepted that oral histories are 
not necessarily the absolute truth.  Anyone dismissing 
oral history because the narrators detail some mythical 
explanations may be discarding some good primary 
source material.  
The keynote speaker at the 2014 Barcelona 
International Oral History Conference73 stated that 
people who have a hidden history which is brought into 
the public record are living in heaven, for their hidden 
history had been recognised.  This research suggests 
that a hidden history which continues to be denied puts 
the participants of that history into a living hell, as their 
life is not recognised, especially if that denial comes 
from official sources.  
One member of the ambush patrol refused to take part 
in this research for he did not want the story of the 
Bamboo Pickers or another incident not explored in 
this article to be known in his hometown.  He lives 
in fear of his history in the war being exposed, and 
shown to be different from the sanitised version of 
the Vietnam ANZAC legend.  He lives this legend in 
various clubs, but lives in fear of exposure.
The longest and the shortest speakers about this incident 
had made contact with me some time before the 
Welcome March in 1983.74  They had formed working 
relationships with me.  One was where cooperation 
between two government departments was the basis 
for our friendship renewal, and the other was co-
membership on a committee of a branch of the Royal 
Australian Regiment.   This later narrator arranged 
for my appointment as our battalion representative. 
Both relationships were on an equal basis, rather than 
one being in a position of authority as was the case 
in our time on the battlefield.75  This equality was 
demonstrated by one exploring the Bamboo Pickers 
incident taking as much time as he wished, while the 
other was prepared to dismiss the incident as it took the 
gloss off his ANZAC legend.
This later narrator preferred providing a positive 
image of his Vietnam experience, like the majority of 
my narrators.  I was forced to ask questions to elicit 
discussion of negative aspects of their war service. 
The need to keep parts of his history hidden was made 
evident; he had written a chapter in Bill Parry’s book 
Just A Nasho.76  He wrote about his life as a national 
serviceman and he cited two incidents, both of which 
fitted ‘the Bean template’ for ANZAC military history.77 
His refusal to discuss unpleasant aspects of our life on 
the battlefield is supported by non-participant D, who 
stated that this type of incident should not be discussed. 
However, this person goes on to discuss the incident, 
thus illustrating Portelli’s thesis that opposing parties 
are trying to win the other party and the readers to their 
point of view.  
Alistair Thomson’s hypothesis that veterans tend to 
craft a history they can live with became clear to me 
when presented with peer review comments about this 
article.  Most comments touched the points that I was 
keeping hidden in my own narrative.  The reviewers 
were not pointing to my lack of disclosure, but rather 
raising points to improve the article.  However, when I 
reflected on the comments there were areas that needed 
to be discussed that I was hoping to leave undiscovered. 
These comments have resulted in additions and better 
explanations in this article.  Some material would not 
have been included if the article had it not been peer-
reviewed.
Early childhood taboos clash with Army training 
to kill, and this causes conflicts in remembering, 
especially when it involves the killing of women and 
children.  This dilemma is minimised by embracing the 
national legend; however this is not a lasting solution 
to alleviating pain.
Amongst the platoon, there was acknowledgment of 
the effect of the ambush on me, and I was aware that 
this could introduce a bias into this research.  Where 
the narrators were attuned to my sense of guilt, they did 
adjust their narratives to fit what they thought I needed 
to hear, being careful not to offend me.  The participant, 
who initially refused to say anything about the ambush, 
changed his mind after I stated that I would not be 
upset by discussion about the incident.  He was not 
alone in acknowledging my psychological state after 
the incident, and another soldier claimed I had become 
a changed person after the incident.  There seemed to 
be a concession that most of my soldiers knew I was 
distressed by the incident, and as a result they were 
prepared to comment when I questioned them on it.  I 
was an impediment to full discussion, it seemed.
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Many of the narrators who took part in the ambush 
were angry.  A number stated that the system failed 
to support them and their mates during the public 
disclosures on civilian deaths.  In this case, these oral 
history narratives may correct the speculation and 
ill-founded assertions of both the politicians and the 
media reports of August 1976.
It seems as though they had to place their anger, 
shame and guilt onto a scapegoat.  They found two. 
The machine gunner who sprung the ambush and the 
system which the soldiers believed had not been honest 
with them.  Anger is clearly present in the narratives, 
and the guilt and shame are less obvious but suggested 
by the fact that most did not wish to discuss the matter, 
and had to be questioned to obtain information.  Yet all 
are sure that the rules of engagement were observed.78 
Conclusion
My narrators preferred providing a positive image 
of their Vietnam experience and I was forced to ask 
questions to elicit discussion on negative aspects of 
their war service.  While my research presents a less 
than glowing picture of our battlefield, participants’ 
courage or bravery is not questioned.  The details 
embedded in these oral histories are the narrators’ 
realities, and the facts tallied with the commander’s 
diary and other official documents.  Oral histories can 
be accepted as a perceived truth. 
When telling their stories, veterans tended to 
prefer to follow the theme of the national myth, the 
ANZAC legend.  In this research the majority avoided 
disturbing and unpalatable memories of the incident 
in question.  They demonstrate Thomson’s hypothesis 
that memories are composed so the owner can live with 
them.  A non-participant interviewer may never have 
been told about the ‘ambush’ incident.
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